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Naval shipbuilding in Indonesia is developing and becoming more self-reliant 
with the support of the government, which aims to increase industry capability by 
applying technology transfer as defense offset policy. This research studies countries 
similar to Indonesia in applying technology transfer as the method to increase self-
reliance in the naval shipbuilding industry. Specifically, the research compares India, 
Malaysia, and South Korea in applying technology transfer and other policy to boost self-
reliance for the industry. 
Indonesia’s government has emphasized using technology transfer as the strategy 
to build its industry’s capability to construct naval ships. Yet many countries have had 
only limited success using this approach to build a defense industry. Thus, this research 
considers what other strategy can be applied by the Indonesian government to support 
industry self-reliance and increase its technological capability in building naval ships. 
The study underlines the importance of research and development for self-reliance in the 
defense industry, enabling Indonesia to compete with other shipbuilder nations. 
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Every sovereign country needs to maintain proportional military power in order to 
create stability and provide security within its territorial area on the land, air, and, if 
applicable, sea. In carrying out its mission to protect its people and its territory, a nation’s 
armed forces require sufficient weapon systems to support defense and security 
capability. For when security issues are present, they can hamper the pace of 
development within a country. Therefore, government has the main role in providing 
effective, well-equipped armed forces capable of anticipating and responding to any 
potential conflict that may happen in the future to protect its people, resources, and 
sovereignty from internal and external threats. 
For this reason, Indonesia’s government emphasizes the importance of conducting 
transfer of technology in every defense system or arms procurement as defense offset 
policy to enhance the development of domestic defense industry capability and self-
reliance (Indonesian Ministry of State Secretary, 2015). The agreement for transfer of 
technology in every arms or ship procurement from foreign industry obliges the seller to 
provide transfer of knowledge on how to produce the arms or build the ship to their 
buyer. With this approach, Indonesia can benefit from technology development and 
economic growth by relying on investment in the defense industry sector. As the biggest 
archipelagic country in the world, Indonesia’s demand for maritime technology is high. It 
requires this technology to be able to explore and exploit the sea’s natural resources 
properly and maintain it as the nation’s source for future assets. The previous 
government, after the reform era in 1998, had already realized the importance of self-
reliance when it established several state-owned “strategic enterprises” to support the 
defense industry and economic development. These strategic state-owned enterprises are 
expected to be capable of supporting the nation’s armed forces capability with indigenous 
arms production. 
This thesis studies the growth within the naval shipbuilding industry in Indonesia 
compared to that industry in Malaysia, as the closest neighboring country, and other 
countries in the region with higher rates of development in the naval shipbuilding 
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industry. Such countries include India and South Korea. This research uses data from the 
comparative analysis so that Indonesia can better understand the government strategy on 
naval shipbuilding industry development. Indonesia is in the process of improving its 
naval shipbuilding capability through its grand maritime strategy,1 the goal of which is to 
gain competitive advantage in the maritime industry. While taking his oath as the elected 
president of the Republic of Indonesia in 2014, President Joko Widodo restated his 
mission disclosed during his campaign, which is to build Indonesia by focusing on the 
development of Indonesia as a maritime nation and becoming a global maritime axis 
(Shekhar & Liow, 2014). The Indonesian government will work hard in enhancing 
maritime connectivity and commerce, as well as strengthening maritime security to 
promote safe conduct of maritime activity within Indonesia’s ocean territory. Hence, 
Indonesia will also need to build the shipbuilding industry infrastructure to fill the need 
for ships by the domestic market. According to Marsetio, the Indonesian Navy has 
planned the navy blueprint to modernize and build its power based on a minimum 
number of essential forces (MEF) 2010–2024 (Marsetio, 2014a). 
Underlining the grand maritime strategy and Indonesia’s vision to be the global 
maritime axis, the Indonesian government’s approach is to apply the transfer of 
technology as the nation’s strategic method for producing as many naval ships as possible 
indigenously. The motivation behind this grand maritime strategy is to gain control 
across its vast economic exclusive zone (EEZ). This thesis argues the government 
motivation for boosting the self-reliance of the naval shipbuilding industry is supported 
by an insufficient application of policy. According to Lee, Indonesia’s armed forces 
modernization included here for the naval forces capability improvement is based on 
domestic politics, with the stability of internal security as the main concern. The 
government’s approach is to fulfill the people’s desire to gain prestige by having a self-
reliant defense industry, reducing the need for the procurement of various kinds of 
modern sophisticated military platforms from external sources, which was considered a 
corrupt defense policy that caused an unbalanced force structure (Lee, 2015). 
                                                 
1 Indonesia’s grand maritime strategy aims to enhance the inter-island connectivity supported by 
strong ships transportation, economic activity through and at the sea and to improve the maritime security 
by maximizing own industry capability (Shekhar & Liow, 2014). 
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According to Augier and Marshall, strategy differs from goals and it is important 
to differentiate between strategy and goals to properly analyze the strategy (Augier & 
Marshall, 2017). Strategy can be defined as “the science and art of employing the 
political, economic, psychological, and military forces of a nation or group of nations to 
afford the maximum support to adopted policies in peace or war” (“Strategy,” n.d.). 
Strategy is rapidly changing and requires identifying its own advantage and the weakness 
of competitors to gain competitive advantage over the long-term while also taking into 
account external forces such as the environment and competition, which tend to change 
(Augier & Marshall, 2017). Indonesian government needs to evaluate its strategy 
continuously by providing proper analysis of the competitive environment to create long-
term competitive advantage in the naval shipbuilding industry. Therefore, the government 
has to evaluate the defense offset policy approach by studying the successes of other 
countries such as India, Malaysia, and South Korea. At the same time, Indonesia must 
also learn from any inefficiency or ineffectiveness found in other countries’ approach to 
applying the defense offset policy. 
Indonesia’s defense spending is considered low compared to that of other nations 
within the region. Even though it seems to increase in nominal value rapidly from the 
previous year’s budget, the total budget for the nation’s military spending still stays under 
1% of gross domestic product (GDP) (Lee, 2015). For the naval force building plan, the 
country will strictly follow the navy’s blueprint for fulfilling the navy MEF 2010–2024 
(Lee, 2015). For the short term, though, the government must be able to compete with 
regional development in military power, especially naval power, by procurement of new 
and modern naval ships from other countries. While engaged in this procurement of naval 
ships in the short term, the government should consider the long-term strategy for the 
transfer of technology process and should be consistent in applying the grand maritime 
strategy for Indonesia’s development in order to close the technology gap with other 
countries in the region. The military industry, such as naval shipbuilding, is a strategic 
industry. To beat the competition in the maritime industry is to become the potential 
market leader in the future, which will expand the work force in domestic ship production 
and enhance the technology mastery within the nation. 
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A. IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY 
The importance of this thesis research is to discuss and provide further 
information about the current position of Indonesia’s naval shipbuilding industry by 
studying the history of India, Malaysia, and South Korea as comparisons. Those countries 
are considered as role models for successfully increasing the capability and the self-
reliance within their respective naval shipbuilding industries. By maximizing the 
momentum from Indonesia’s grand maritime strategy to support the maritime industry, 
this research provides an analysis with respect to the success of the Indian and South 
Korean governments’ policy effectiveness and the steps that could be done by the 
Indonesian government in applying the same adjusted strategy and defense offset policy 
to support the naval shipbuilding industry. 
What caused Indonesia, as a country with the same defense offset policy as India 
and South Korea, to have slower improvement in its naval shipbuilding industry over the 
70 years since the nation gained independence? To answer this question, this thesis 
studies Indonesia’s history in terms of the application of government policy that may 
inhibit the development of the maritime industry in Indonesia and the effects that policy 
has had on the current capability of Indonesia’s naval shipbuilding industry. 
B. BACKGROUND 
The government as the policy maker and the consumer has an important role in 
supporting the sustainability of the naval shipbuilding industry so that it can compete 
with other producers overseas. The naval shipbuilding industry in Indonesia has had little 
improvement since the government first conducted the offset policy in defense systems 
procurement in 1960. Before we examine this history, it is important to define defense 
offset policy, which is an arms trade contract between countries that requires the seller 
country to provide certain added value for the benefit of the customer or purchaser 
country (Taylor, 2003). 
The naval shipbuilding industry in Indonesia is an integral part of the 
government’s quest to produce its own indigenous arms industry. PT Penataran Angkatan 
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Laut (PT PAL2) as a state-owned company and other domestic shipbuilding industries 
could provide the naval shipbuilding capacity for Indonesia’s government to support the 
navy’s requirement in building the MEF to compete with other military powers in the 
region. The government policy in defense procurement in the form of technology transfer 
is expected to improve the naval shipbuilding industry’s self-reliance in Indonesia and 
meet these goals (Indonesian Ministry of State Secretary, 2015). 
Defense offset policy has been practiced informally by Indonesia’s government in 
the procurement of defense systems since the early 1960s (see Figure 1). Yet, it was not 
practiced officially until ten years later when the nation restructured PT PAL to support 
the naval shipbuilding industry and other strategic industries that serve the indigenous 
arms industry in Indonesia. Furthermore, the practice was not continued consistently by 
the government in 1985 when the offset policy could apply for transfer of technology in 
some strategic industry production of fast patrol craft and corvette ships. Defense offsets 
practice in Indonesia is still not sufficient to create self-reliance for building integral 
defense systems. This shortcoming is due to the lack of human resources, low defense 
spending, and the lack of ancillary industry to supply ship components in the shipbuilding 
industry such as the steel industry, propulsion machinery industry, advance sensor and 
weapon systems industry (Tippe, 2013). These problems still exist in Indonesia despite a 
small improvement within the industry to meet the nation’s challenge. 
                                                 
2 PT PAL is Indonesia’s state-owned shipbuilding industry, which was nationalized by the Indonesian 
government after Indonesia gained its independent in 1945 (Kukuh, 2017). 
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Figure 1.  Indonesia’s Shipbuilding Timeline 
President Soekarno as the first president of the Republic of Indonesia had the 
same vision to strengthen Indonesia’s maritime forces since it is an archipelagic nation of 
17,508 islands. In this era, Indonesian Navy power constituted the largest naval power in 
South East Asia supported by strong naval force composition (Global Security, 2013b). 
President Soekarno gained better bilateral cooperation with Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (USSR) and strengthened the naval forces using ships from the USSR as a 
producer country willing to provide transfer of technology as the offset policy. When 
President Soeharto replaced President Soekarno on March 12, 1967, the government 
tended to choose Western defense systems to modernize its military power (Global 
Security, 2013a). President Soeharto was an army general at that time and shifted the 
nation’s strategy and vision as an agricultural nation, not a seagoing power, and declined 
the navy influence within the armed forces (Global Security, 2013a). 
The Indonesian government’s inconsistency in applying the defense offset policy 
became the main factor for the defense industry’s setback in achieving self-reliance 
(Tippe, 2013). During President Soeharto’s era, the government of Indonesia seldom used 
offset policy for the procurement and acquisition of defense systems in Indonesia. This 
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weapons procurement program brought less benefit for Indonesia because it lacked any 
transfer of technology, which would have been useful to build a self-reliant defense 
industry within the country. Hence, weapons maintenance has been expensive since 
Indonesia has always relied on the producer country for spare parts and skilled 
technicians to fix the weapons. Government of President Yudhoyono started the initiation 
and promotion of the indigenous defense industry through transfer of technology, and the 
consistency of President Widodo’s government continued the policy and emphasized it 
through a grand maritime strategy to build the nation’s shipbuilding industry by building 
government’s ships indigenously. Therefore, the government’s consistency and sound 
strategy is required to support a sustainable shipbuilding industry. 
C. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
This research discusses the government policy for a self-reliant naval shipbuilding 
industry in Indonesia. The naval shipbuilding industry is considered an integral part of 
the nation’s effort in building indigenous defense industry self-reliance. This research 
also discusses the nation’s general shipbuilding industry as the foundation of a 
sustainable naval shipbuilding industry. The focus is on government policies and whether 
the government can take any further steps to stimulate other ancillary industries for 
supporting a sustainable naval shipbuilding industry. 
Using India, Malaysia, and South Korea for comparison, the discussion analyzes 
whether Indonesia could apply other countries’ policies to improve Indonesia’s 
shipbuilding industry. The study reviews each government’s policies and then analyzes 
the strengths and weaknesses of each country’s applied defense policy to support their 
respective naval shipbuilding industry. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
The research conducts a literature review on industry self-reliance and how 
current Indonesian defense officials and national policy makers have pursued this as a 
policy goal for several years. This research is supported by available web-based data and 
information to analyze the strategy suitable for applying Indonesia’s defense offset policy 
to create self-reliance in the naval shipbuilding industry in Indonesia. 
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This thesis research took place at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, 
CA, and relies on various journal articles gathered from the Internet and other library 
materials as sources for the literature review in these areas: 
1. A review of Indonesia’s grand maritime strategy 
2. A review of naval modernization in a developing country 
3. A comparison of policies between India, Malaysia, and South Korea 
4. An analysis of existing policies in India, Malaysia, and South Korea and 
the effects of those policies on supporting technology and shipbuilding 
advances compared to Indonesia 
5. SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats) analysis, 
including the risk in the shipbuilding industry as a consideration 
6. A research report 
E. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND THESIS STATEMENT 
Research questions to be addressed in this thesis are as follows: 
1. What factors are likely to inhibit self-reliance in Indonesia’s naval 
shipbuilding industry? 
2. Is the policy applied in Indonesia as a developing country sufficient to 
achieve the goal of domestic naval shipbuilding industry self-reliance? 
3. How do comparison countries conduct policy and strategy to support naval 
shipbuilding industry self-reliance? 
A sustainable defense industry as a strategic enterprise owned by Indonesia holds 
an important role in the development of technology and the economy. Indonesia, which 
consists of islands and a vast area of territorial waters, requires robust naval forces. At the 
same time, the military budget limits the military expenditures for procuring naval ships 
abroad. 
This research defines what self-reliance means for a naval shipbuilding industry 
and attempts to identify government policy and further strategy that contributes to the 
development of the shipbuilding industry, enabling it to become a self-reliant for 
supporting the Indonesian Navy. 
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F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
Chapter I presents an introduction and provides the purpose and importance of the 
thesis research. Chapter II reviews the literature and theoretical discussions of the 
concept of self-reliance for the defense industry; the chapter also includes an assessment 
of India, Malaysia, and South Korea as comparison countries. Chapter III provides an 
analysis of what self-reliance means in the context of the naval shipbuilding industry in 
Indonesia. Chapter IV provides the strategy to support naval shipbuilding industry self-
reliance. Chapter V concludes this thesis research and discusses possible future research 
topics. 
G. CONCLUSION 
The research discusses the feasibility of Indonesia as a developing country to 
produce an indigenous arms industry, especially in the naval shipbuilding industry, and to 
develop military industry self-reliance within the country. Indonesia has already started 
with President Joko Widodo’s vision for the nation to be the global maritime fulcrum and 
started to build the necessary infrastructure. The government provides the policies as 
regulations to enhance the growth of the maritime industry around the country. However, 
the naval shipbuilding industry carries high risk and requires high capital for investment. 
Thus, government policy and good strategy are required to support the shipbuilding 
industry and the mastery of naval shipbuilding technology that will promote Indonesia’s 
national resilience and competitive advantage as a maritime nation. 
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II. REVIEW OF SELF-RELIANCE IN THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY 
This chapter provides a review of the literature on the concept of self-reliance 
associated with developing an indigenous defense industry through a defense offset 
policy applied to countries in the Asia Pacific. Then, the research discusses the nations in 
the region pursuing self-reliance in the naval shipbuilding industry. The main purpose is 
to elaborate the concept of self-reliance for the countries in Asia, especially countries 
near Indonesia, such as India, Malaysia, and South Korea that are potential models for 
pursuing self-reliance in the naval shipbuilding industry. The last section discusses the 
Asia Pacific nations’ naval modernization efforts that also become the reason and 
opportunity to build the capacity for an indigenous naval shipbuilding industry. 
A. THE LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL DISCUSSION OF 
THE CONCEPT OF SELF-RELIANCE FOR THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY 
The concept of self-reliance for the defense industry means the nation’s capability 
to support its indigenous defense industry to arm military personnel with weapons and 
achieve autarky or self-sufficiency. Yet, according to Hoyt, the self-reliance concept still 
allows the nation to import weapon systems or military armament from reliable 
counterparts mostly to close the gap in technology and the capability in producing 
modern and sophisticated weapons to counter current threats (Hoyt, 2007). The concept 
of self-reliance for the defense industry mostly applies to countries developing strategic 
industries but still not capable of producing advanced weapon systems. In such situations, 
the government then conducts defense offset policy3 to encourage the strategic industry 
to become involved in production through licensed production, co-development, transfer 
of technology, etc., to close the gap and avoid the cost for research and development 
(R&D) already accomplished by other countries with advanced defense industries. Figure 
2 explains the relationship between levels of defense industry self-sufficiency with the 
corresponding strategy applied by a country and the degree to which that contributes to 
the cost of the effort. 
                                                 
3 Defense offset policy is an arms trade contract between countries that requires the seller country to 
provide certain added value for the benefit of the customer or purchaser country (Tippe, 2013). 
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Figure 2.  The Arms Production Ladder. Source: 
Bitzinger (2004). 
The production ladder in the arms industry for less developed countries depends 
on the technology advances of other nations with greater defense industry capability, and 
commonly does so by using a defense offset policy mechanism (Bitzinger, 2004). 
Defense offset policy that supports the indigenous defense industry to achieve self-
reliance based on the ladder shown in Figure 2 includes the transfer of technology4 
through licensed production and co-development or co-production with other nations.  
The strategy in using the defense offset policy approach will vary among 
countries. According to Bitzinger, different goals and drivers explain how a country 
pursuing defense industrialization use defense offsets policy to support self-reliance. The 
most important factor will actually affect how offset approaches will be applied to fit into 
the particular country’s strategy for self-reliance (Bitzinger, Offsets and defense 
industrialization in Indonesia and Singapore, 2004); those motivations when applied to 
domestic naval shipbuilding industry self-reliance are: 
                                                 
4 The transfer of technology contract in arms or ship procurements from foreign industry obliges the 
seller to provide transfer of knowledge on how to produce the arms or build the ship to their buyer. 
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1. Strategic reason (Bitzinger, 2004).  
• To be able to guard and defend the sovereignty of its territory, especially 
when countering a real or perceived security threat (Huxley & Willett, 
Defence Industries in East Asia, 1999). By having naval shipbuilding 
industry self-reliance, Indonesia as an archipelagic country can protect its 
sea natural resources from the threat of other countries and provide a 
degree of freedom to decide its own strength in building the maritime 
power of Indonesia. 
2. Arms embargo (Huxley & Willett, Defence Industries in East Asia, 1999). 
• To keep the nation’s political independence by having a self-reliant naval 
shipbuilding industry and sustainable defense industry. A country’s efforts 
to overcome terrorism or oppose drug smuggling, for example, must not 
be hampered by the supplier who intentionally tries to delay the delivery 
of a weapon. This motivation is to reduce the reliance on weapon 
procurements from other country. Thus, the navy can provide better 
service in guarding the sea border from other trespassers, including those 
who try to steal the nation’s natural resources. Furthermore, the country’s 
military operations will avoid feeling limited by embargoes or sanctions 
from another country as a type of supplier constraint. 
3. National prestige (Huxley & Willett, Defence Industries in East Asia, 
1999). 
• To increase the country’s prestige of having defense industry self-reliance, 
in this context, by having a sustainable naval shipbuilding industry that 
will enable the concepts of national power within a country. It will also 
demonstrate industrial and technological prowess. 
4. Multiple effect (Midhio, 2016). 
• To support technological development and modern industrial culture for 
economic strength. Ultimately, the country will be recognized by other 
countries as an arms exporter country and gain more foreign currency 
revenue. The government then can build the nation’s military capability 
and develop its economy through industrialization simultaneously. 
5. Domestic employment opportunity (Nackman, 2011). 
• To create more job opportunities and stimulate the interest of scientists, 
engineers, and technicians in the naval shipbuilding industry consistent 
with technology advances. Sustainable shipbuilding industry requires 
continuous improvement and R&D capability which will promote better 
education and furthermore to enhance the growth of creative industries as 
ancillary industries to support domestic shipbuilding industry. 
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6. “Technology locomotive” (Bitzinger, 2004). 
• To enhance the growth of other new industries as the nation’s pioneer to 
facilitate the modernization and create new technology improvement by 
having vital R&D in the military and naval shipbuilding industries. The 
technology developed through domestic naval shipbuilding industry such 
as Radar, marine machinery, ship’s components then can be applied for 
civilian shipbuilding industries. 
7. Deterrent effect (Midhio, 2016). 
• To deter potential threats through naval shipbuilding industry self-reliance 
capable of building and maintaining own naval power of a country. The 
capability provides the flexibility to produce as many advanced navy ships 
as possible within the government’s budget for military expenditure. 
In the current government policy for supporting the maritime industry, questions 
remain on whether that policy to support self-reliance in the naval shipbuilding industry 
is sufficient to answer the future challenge for Indonesia. Self-reliance in the naval 
shipbuilding industry for this thesis means that the country’s shipbuilding industry is 
capable of producing its own naval ships based on the respective navy requirements of its 
forces composition. This thesis argues that the strategy for achieving self-reliance by 
transfer of technology as the only method will not be sufficient to support Indonesia’s 
quest for self-reliance in its naval shipbuilding industry. 
Indonesia’s pursuit of self-reliance in this industry arises primarily from economic 
and industrialization motivation (Bitzinger, Offsets and defense industrialization in 
Indonesia and Singapore, 2004; Huxley & Willett, 1999). Understanding the nation’s 
motivation for defense industry self-reliance can help the government in crafting the 
strategy to strengthen the domestic defense industry with long-term planning and 
accurate decisions. While a strategic reason such as national sovereignty for guarding the 
sea border and “real or perceived external security threats as well as arms embargoes are 
[also] important in encouraging [the government] to promote domestic defense 
production” (Huxley & Willett, 1999). This thesis argues Indonesia’s motivation to apply 
the offset policy to achieve indigenous naval shipbuilding industry self-reliance does not 
sufficiently reflect strategic motivation, and thus, as previously asserted by this author, 
the strategy is not effective to support domestic naval shipbuilding industry self-reliance. 
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B. NAVAL SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY SELF-RELIANCE 
Building and maintaining the navy will depend on the government’s willingness 
to spend its budget to build the desired navy. The bigger the navy a nation wants to have, 
the more resources and budget are needed to build the navy’s capability. The 
government’s policy to build the naval shipbuilding industry will ultimately influence the 
naval capability a country will have. Countries that want a large navy will also pay 
attention to the industry’s ability to support building the desired maritime power. The 
government and domestic shipbuilding industries need to work together to improve 
industry self-reliance. The industry needs to improve competitive advantage by 
increasing its capability by having the government continuously procure to support the 
industry as a potential domestic market. Likewise, it must win export opportunities to 
maintain its sustainability as a long-term strategy. The relationship between naval 
shipbuilding capability and maritime power is shown in Tables 1 and 2. 
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Table 1.   World Naval Shipbuilding Capability and Naval Hierarchy. 
Adapted from Todd and Lindberg (1996). 
World Naval Shipbuilding Capability 
Hierarchy 
World Naval Hierarchy 
Group 1: 
China, France, Russia, UK, USA 
1. Global-Reach Power-Projection Navy: 
United States of America 
Group 2: 
Germany, India, Italy, Japan, South Korea, 
Spain 
2. Limited Global-Reach Power-Projection 
Navies: 
France, United Kingdom 
Group 3: 
Canada, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden 
3. Multi/Extra-Regional Power-Projection 
Navies: 
India, Italy, Russia, Spain 
Group 4: 
Australia, Brazil, Poland, Taiwan, Turkey 
4. Regional Power-Projection Navies: 
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, 
China, Germany, Greece, Japan, South Korea, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, Peru, 
Portugal, Taiwan, Turkey 
Group 5: 
Argentina, Belgium, Chile, Greece, 
Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, New Zealand, 
North Korea, Romania, Singapore, South 
Africa, Thailand, Ukraine 
5. Regional Offshore Coastal Defense Navies: 
Bangladesh, Colombia, Denmark, Ecuador, 
Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, North Korea, 
Malaysia, Norway, Poland, Romania, Saudi 
Arabia, Sweden, Thailand, Venezuela 
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Table 2.   Current Naval Shipbuilding Capability and Naval Hierarchy for the 
Selected Countries 
Naval Shipbuilding Capability 
Hierarchy 
World Naval Hierarchy 
India (Group 1) 
Considered as group 1 based on the 
capability to build aircraft carrier and 
having nuclear capability (Rai, 2015) 
Limited/Global-Reach Power-Projection 
Navy 
India’s improving capability as a blue 
water navy (Gokhale, 2013) 
South Korea (Group 2) 
Considered as group 2 based on the 
capability to build fleet aircraft carrier 
Dokdo Class Landing Platform Helicopter 
with displacement of 14,000 tons and the 
country has no nuclear capability yet 
(Global Security, 2016) 
Multi/Extra-Regional Power-Projection 
Navy 
Blue water navy capability with the 
capability for extended operations within 
East Asia (Schreer, 2013) 
Indonesia (Group 5, improving to Group 4) 
The nation is still developing the capability 
to build submarine by building submarine 
facility and transfer of technology by the 
assistances of South Korea’s industry (The 
World Folio, 2013) 
Regional Offshore Coastal Defense Navy 
Malaysia (Group 5) 
The nation is not yet to have submarine 
building capability and facility 
Regional Offshore Coastal Defense Navy 
 
The capability hierarchy shown in the two previous tables indicates the naval 
shipbuilding capability of the nation to support the development of naval power in 
building the naval ships required by the navy in these countries. South Korea has made 
the progress in developing its blue water navy capability by building more ships and 
submarines to raise its ranking in the world naval hierarchy with the support of domestic 
shipbuilding industry (Schreer, 2013). Without the capability of the shipbuilding 
industry, it would be very difficult for a country to build a large naval force as desired, as 
it would require a great deal of foreign currency for naval ships procurement. Whereas, if 
a country has the ability to produce a sustainable naval shipbuilding industry, it simply 
builds the desired maritime power by relying on its own industry, supporting the 
country’s economy by employing its people.  
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Table 3.   Characteristics of Naval Shipbuilding Industry Capability Groups. 
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When building its navy, a nation can choose whether to build it with its own 
shipbuilding industry or outsource the project to a foreign country already advanced in 
naval shipbuilding capability. When a country wants to pursue the first option, it must 
consider certain naval shipbuilding industry capability requirements to assess whether its 
own naval shipbuilding industry is sufficiently self-reliant to build its respective navy. 
These standard requirements are shown in Table 4. 
Table 4.   Standard Domestic Naval Shipbuilding Capability. Adapted from 
Todd and Lindberg (1996). 
Type of Navy Standard Domestic Naval Shipbuilding Capability Level 
Global reach power projection 1 
Limited global reach power projection 1 
Multi regional power projection 2 
Regional power projection 3 / 4 
Regional offshore coastal defense 4 / 5 
Inshore coastal defense 0 
Regional offshore constabulary 6 
 
For most Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, the naval 
shipbuilding industry is assumed to be a strategic industry owned by a nation to support 
building and maintaining its navy for the purpose of national security. The Indonesian 
Ministry of Industry website in 2015 described the importance of defense industry self-
reliance for driving the economy and technology development, and mentions that the 
nation’s defense industry should be controlled by the government (Indonesian Ministry of 
Industry, 2015). The website emphasizes the important role of the national strategic 
enterprise in Indonesia to be sustainable. A strong defense industry will support the 
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nation’s military force by owning local armaments suitable for all services and can be 
improved to meet the warfighter or user requirements by the industry capability through 
R&D (Indonesian Ministry of Defence, 2015). 
The Indonesian defense industry still cannot provide its own defense forces with 
strong military equipment. Thus, the government relies on the import of military 
armaments. In every defense system procurement, however, the Indonesian government 
conducts the transfer of technology to meet the requirements. This step is important in 
reducing the nation’s dependence on other countries in defense procurement (Indonesian 
Ministry of State Secretary, 2015). 
Based on Figure 3, we can see the naval acquisition strategy of the ASEAN 
countries applies defense offset policy to achieve self-reliant naval shipbuilding industry. 
The policy model for achieving this strategy will mostly be supported by an offset policy 
using the transfer of technology. Thus, the nation must have a sustainable defense 
industry to absorb the technology transfers conducted from the offset policy. Government 
involvement is important for industry sustainability because the naval shipbuilding’s 
market is limited in demand to its own navy and exports to other countries through the 
government-to-government sales agreement procedure. Each ASEAN country 
emphasizes the importance of self-reliance through industrialization to fulfill their 
requirements for naval acquisition. Hence, the industry will experience competitive 
market, which will require updates and continuous evaluation to achieve competitive 
advantage to maintain sustainable naval shipbuilding industry. 
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Figure 3.  ASEAN’s Naval Acquisition Model. Source: 
Matthews and Lozano (2014). 
C. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS WITH INDIA, SOUTH KOREA, AND 
MALAYSIA 
India, South Korea, and Malaysia have applied defense offset policy for 
developing their respective indigenous naval shipbuilding industries to reach self-
reliance. However, each country has its own approach to conducting the defense offset 
policy to improve domestic naval shipbuilding industry capacity and self-reliance. As 
shown in Figure 4, due to the high threat level with the region, India and South Korea 
give more attention to national security by providing a higher budget for defense 
spending. Because threats to Indonesia and Malaysia in the region are not as high as they 
are for South Korea and India, Indonesia and Malaysia also provide less defense spending 
than the two other countries. By comparing the military expenditures, we can identify 
each country’s willingness to spend for the security of its territory. 
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Figure 4.  Military Expenditure for India, Indonesia, Malaysia, and South Korea. 
Source: Our World in Data (2017). 
1. Review of India’s Government Effort for Self-Reliance in the Naval 
Shipbuilding Industry 
India’s Independence Day was August 15, 1947, and the country has been 
pursuing self-reliance in the defense industry since that day. Officially, the effort to have 
an indigenous self-reliant naval shipbuilding industry started in 1950 when the nation 
started to build small naval ships consisting of survey ships, minesweepers, and patrol 
craft. India’s Ministry of Defense (MoD) then nationalized a few naval shipbuilding 
companies in 1960 to support building the nation’s maritime power and started to 
produce big naval ships of the frigate type indigenously at Mazagon Dock Ltd (MDL). 
Since then the MoD of India was able to manage four defense public sector undertaking 
(DPSU) companies involved in naval shipbuilding and, until mid-2011, contributed in 
building nearly 90 ships and submarines (Behera & Misra, 2012). 
The Indian government’s perception of national security is divided into four 
concerns, which are internal threats (counter-insurgence from separatist movements), 
regional threats from Pakistan, extra-regional threats from China, and superpower threats 
from Russia. The superpower threats were well taken care of by diplomatic relations in 
the form of a treaty of peace and defense cooperation (Hoyt, 2007). However, India’s 
government takes the regional and extra-regional threats seriously by building its 
maritime force composition as a multi-regional power projection navy. This strategic 
motivation to guard the nation’s sovereignty by building a large naval power requires a 
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significant amount of resources and military spending. India’s goal to build its blue water 
navy for multi-regional power projection has been supported by the self-reliant naval 
shipbuilding industry. Without the industry, most of the military expenditure would have 
had to go to foreign naval shipbuilders, which would have meant losing the opportunity 
to build own economy from defense industry sector. This would have also become a 
financial burden in the form of national spending on foreign currency and increasing 
India’s dependence on foreign naval shipbuilders. 
Previously India’s government pursued defense industry self-sufficiency to fulfill 
its requirements for military armaments. The government then shifted its policy to self-
reliance in the defense industry during the 1970s to achieve technological improvement 
since the country was left behind in advanced technology development by the Western 
defense industry. The government policy for defense industry self-reliance provided the 
chance for the country to import weapon systems from trusted foreign country partners 
(Hoyt, 2007). The Indian government’s approach has centered on implementing a defense 
offset policy. The concept of self-reliance in developing the indigenous defense industry 
can be seen from the Indian government’s consistency in applying three major aspects of 
offset policy: transfer of technology/licensed production, defense procurements by using 
exports commodity “barter trade,” and a “long-term credit” mechanism (Baskaran, 2004; 
Behera, 2009). 
The naval shipbuilding industry in India has experienced improvement in 
infrastructure and an increase in capacity for shipbuilding due to the increase in demand 
for naval ships requirements of the navy since 1970. The industry provides more 
employment opportunities for the Indian people. The Indian government also supports 
R&D through its Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO), which 
increases industry self-reliance for all military weapon systems purposes, including naval 
weapons capability. DRDO employs approximately 5,000 scientists and 25,000 
technicians, highly skilled workers responsible for all defense industry R&D, in 
cooperation with Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd., Bharat Electronic Ltd., and Bharat 
Dynamics Ltd. (Hoyt, 2007). 
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Furthermore, the Indian naval shipbuilding industry has grown significantly to 
support the development of the Indian Navy, enabling it to have the capability of a multi/
extra-regional power-projection navy. The industry was included in Group 2 in the World 
Naval Shipbuilding Capability hierarchy, shown earlier in Table 1 (Todd & Lindberg, 
1996). India’s domestic industry’s capability in supporting India’s naval requirements has 
contributed to making India the world’s fifth largest maritime power. Nevertheless, the 
naval shipbuilding industry is still experiencing inefficiency in cost and poor delivery 
time due to the non-competitive environment, lack of design capability, and unavailable 
ancillary industry, especially for marine machinery and engine propulsion (Behera & 
Misra, 2012). 
2. Review of South Korea’s Government Effort for Self-Reliance 
South Korea’s increase in industries development started in the 1970s when the 
government conducted defense industrialization to support the nation’s economy. The 
nation’s Independence Day was August 15th, 1948, and since then the naval shipbuilding 
industry capability in the country has been enhanced by the private shipbuilding 
industries with its advanced development in industrialization. Yet, South Korea’s 
shipbuilding industry was not growing until the 1970s, when the government supported 
the industries by providing policy that promoted large enterprises and a competitive 
environment for the industry. The shipbuilding industry was then positioned as a strategic 
industry and the government opened the industry to stimulate investments in this sector 
(Hassink & Shin, 2005). Its significant effort to increase capability and capacity in the 
shipbuilding industry was achieved in 30 years, which was a relatively shorter time than 
that needed by India, which had started to pursue self-reliance since the 1960s. During 
the 1970s and 1980s, South Korea’s shipbuilding industry became the leader in the 
region. The shipbuilding industry’s capacity increased by a factor of five between 1975 
and 1990, from 0.4 million compensated gross tons (CGT) to 1.8 million CGT, with the 
support of 45,000 employees (Global Security, 2017). 
South Korea’s motivation for self-reliance in the defense industry was prompted 
in 1977 by the President Carter’s announcement of the withdrawal of United States 
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ground troops from South Korea, which caused concern about security and possible 
threats from North Korea (Han, 1978). At the same, generous U.S. support for 
technological transfer to its ally countries in the region, such as Japan, South Korea, and 
Taiwan, sparked South Korea’s motivation for defense industrialization (Chinworth, 
2004). The government’s consistency in its policy for building South Korea’s defense 
industry self-reliance created a new opportunity in every defense procurement to gain 
technological capability from the application of offset policy through transfer of 
technology packages from European shipbuilders and weapon system suppliers. 
The government’s policy for conducting defense offset policy supporting the 
South Korea’s private shipbuilding industry promoted the naval shipbuilding industry’s 
capability. The next factor to support the naval shipbuilding industry in the country was 
the government policy to support R&D. R&D investment for about 7% of a nation’s GDP 
is considered strong support in R&D for the defense sectors (Business Monitor 
International Ltd., 2017). South Korea first acquired submarine shipbuilding capability 
by transfer of technology through a licensed production agreement with a German 
shipbuilder. The country acquired three Type 209–1,200 Chang Bogo class submarines. 
The first submarine was built in Germany by Howaldtswerke-Deutche Werft (HDW) and 
the other two were built in Korea by Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering 
(DSME). The shipbuilding industry was then capable of building more advanced 
technology 1,800-tonne type-214 submarines (Storey, 2014). 
The South Korean naval shipbuilding industry was growing rapidly to support the 
development of the Republic of Korea Navy, enabling it to have the capability of a 
regional power-projection navy. The industry was included in the Group 2 in the World 
Naval Shipbuilding Capability hierarchy, as shown earlier in Table 1 (Todd & Lindberg, 
1996). The industry self-reliance makes it capable of supporting the current government’s 
vision to build a blue water navy as an achievable goal. With its R&D capability, the 
nation currently plans to build a “3,000-ton submarine,” which will be “equipped with 
vertical launch missile capability,” to start the development President Kim Young-Sam 
approved in his chief of naval operations’ proposal for South Korea’s blue water navy 
(Schreer, 2013). 
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3. Review of Malaysia’s Government Effort for Self-Reliance 
Malaysia’s shipbuilding industry started to build an offshore patrol vessel (OPV) 
indigenously in 1994. This was the first attempt to build navy ships using the indigenous 
defense industry since Malaysia’s Independence Day on August 31, 1957. The effort 
included that transfer of technology through licensed production with German Naval 
Group and was assessed as a failure due to the production process that took ten times 
longer than previously planned and delivered only 18 OPV, nine fewer than planned. The 
unsuccessful application of offset policy caused a setback for Malaysia’s government and 
was attributed to the lack of experience and technological expertise in the indigenous 
shipbuilding industry (Basiron & Kia, 2014). Only a limited number of defense industry-
related jobs exist for the Malaysian people, and those are typically only low-skilled jobs 
(Basiron & Kia, 2014). 
Transfer of technology in Malaysia has failed because of many factors. The local 
industries failed to provide improvements and support to supply high technology 
components for the defense industry. The nation still greatly depends on foreign industry 
by importing high technology, components or parts, and machinery. The industrial base 
still lacks capability and capacity to provide raw materials for the industry. As an 
example, Malaysia still needs to import steel and composites (Balakrishnan & Matthews, 
2009). Furthermore, the offset policy did not support long-term R&D purposes which are 
expensive and limited domestic demand for defense procurement limits domestic defense 
industry sustainability (Balakrishnan & Matthews, 2009). Figure 5 shows the R&D 
expenditures of the four countries being compared in this research, reflecting the 
respective government’s support and policy. 
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Figure 5.  R&D Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP.  
Source: The Global Economy (2017) 
It should be noted that while Malaysia’s R&D expenditure may appear higher 
than India’s, the offset policy in Malaysia actually does not promote R&D for the 
industries. According to Balakrishnan and Matthews (2009), “Around 70% of Malaysian 
defense companies spend less than 10% of annual revenues on R&D, almost 90% lack in-
house R&D facilities, and 100% have zero patents.” The Malaysian naval shipbuilding 
industry was not robust enough to support the development of the Royal Malaysian Navy 
by its own industry capacity and capability. The industry was included in the Group 5 in 
the World Naval Shipbuilding Capability hierarchy, as shown earlier in Table 1 (Todd & 
Lindberg, 1996). 
The defense industry such as the naval shipbuilding industry can maintain its 
sustainability because of the government capability in planning the strategy to support 
and protect the industry. The industry in a developed country needs government policy to 
create opportunity, competitive environment and cost efficiency to successfully gain 
market share through naval ship exports to counterpart countries. Table 5 shows each 
country’s different strategy approach through policies applied to maintain the naval 
shipbuilding industry self-reliance. The country comparison shows better self-reliance for 
South Korea and India, which emphasized policy supporting R&D.  
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Table 5.   Comparison in Strategy Approach to Support Indigenous Naval Shipbuilding Industry Self-Reliance 
COMPARISON INDIA MALAYSIA SOUTH KOREA 
Defense offset policy Transfer of Technology/licensed 
production, counter-trade/barter, long-
term credit arrangement 
Transfer of technology/licensed 
production 




Strategic motivation (higher threat 
level), economic motivation 
Economic motivation. Strategic motivation (higher threat 
level), economic motivation 
Naval shipbuilding 
capacity 
- High capacity 
- Public company shipbuilder, less 
incentive to increase efficiency 
- Low capacity 
- Public company shipbuilder less 
incentive to increase efficiency 
- Overcapacity (High) 
- Private company shipbuilder provides 
efficiency and effectiveness 
Private shipbuilding 
company 
Available, Limited to naval 
shipbuilding capability 
Limited Available strong private sector 
Competitive 
Environment 
Limited Limited Available 
Ancillary industry Not available, increases the 
dependence on foreign supplier 
Not available, increases the 
dependence on foreign supplier 
Ancillary industry already available to 
support naval shipbuilding industry 
Military expenditure High military spending 
 
Limited military spending. High military spending. 
Government policy to 
support R&D 
Available. The government provides 
R&D department, mostly for weapon 
system R&D 
Limited Available. The policy supports R&D in 
both industries (naval weapon systems 
and shipbuilding) 
Corruption risk 
(the higher the score the 
lower the risk) 
Scored 29 out of 100 (Business 
Monitor International Ltd., 2017a). 
Scored 30 out of 100 (country risk 
score) (Business Monitor International 
Ltd., 2017c). 
Scored 36 out of 100 (country risk 
score) (Business Monitor International 
Ltd., 2017d). 
Highly skilled workers Available Limited Available 
Assessment - Succeeded in supporting naval 
shipbuilding self-reliance 
- The industry still has some 
inefficiency, especially in cost and 
delivery time 
- Few improvements. The nation’s 
naval modernization still depends on 
foreign procurement 
- Technological gap and lack of 
experience inhibits technology transfer 




D. REGIONAL FACTORS DRIVING NAVAL MODERNIZATION AND 
ARMS RACE 
The increase in economic development in Asia provides the opportunity for 
nations in the region to spend more to modernize military equipment and weapon 
systems. Many Asian countries are strengthening and modernizing their respective navies 
to protect their respective EEZ, which may be vulnerable to other nations’ 
claimsparticularly where there are overlapping claims for exploiting available natural 
resources, such as fishing and oil exploration 
Nevertheless, nations with a strategic motivation, in the context of real or 
perceived threats, are typically more successful in their efforts to drive self-reliance by 
conducting offset policy. South Korea has experienced higher and more intensive threats 
from North Korea than the threat experienced by Japan (Chinworth, 2004). India’s 
experience of war with and security threats from Pakistan and China motivates the nation 
to modernize its military by building an indigenous defense industry (Hilali, 2001). While 
challenges for Indonesia and Malaysia may not seem obvious, the motivation for naval 
modernization and an indigenous naval shipbuilding industry is driven more by economic 
concerns than the strategic ones. However, the Indonesian government may need to build 
and maintain a larger navy to protect its sovereignty at its outermost islands and at sea, 
given the nation’s geographic condition as the biggest archipelagic country in the world. 
Malaysia should be taken seriously as the neighbor country with the potency to 
claim Indonesian territory. A naval stand-off between Indonesia and Malaysia in the 
Ambalat sea area happened after Indonesia lost the Sipadan and Ligitan islands to 
Malaysia after a long-term territorial dispute that ended with the 2002 International Court 
of Justice decision (Greenlees, 2005). Building the navy with the capability to defend the 
sovereignty of the nation and protect Indonesian citizens and territory is also becoming a 
strategic motivation that should be acknowledged by the Indonesia’s government. 
Meanwhile, China is increasing its defense budget and developing its naval power 
to gain more influence in the region. Its claim for South China Sea, defined by a nine-
dash line, has increased tension and poses threats to Indonesia’s sovereignty in the 
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overlapping area (Business Monitor International, 2017). While the sea territory is 
defined by the sea line boundary, an invisible line, its authority is unclear in conflicts 
regarding the usage of other countries’ territories. Malaysia’s government is taking 
China’s threat seriously by the procurement of Lekiu-class frigates, a Scorpene 
submarine, and other naval patrol ships to modernize its navy (Basiron & Kia, 2014). 
Currently, the Indonesian government has renamed the “South China Sea” area to the 
north of Natuna island as the “Natuna Sea.” This reflects Indonesia’s claim to the area as 
an EEZ. These situations increase the importance of the Indonesian government’s efforts 
to build its maritime power to protect the sovereignty of the nation and to make sure the 
people of Indonesia can use the sea’s natural resources for fishing and oil exploration and 
to promote the nation’s prosperity. 
When analyzing and comparing the efforts of other nations in the region to build 
enormous naval forces, it is clear that these other countries are competing to strengthen 
their own naval capabilities. Given this situation, the demand side for the procurements 
of naval ships will likely increase and make a country seriously consider strengthening its 
navy by spending the minimum amount on foreign currency and supporting domestic 
economic growth and technological development through the indigenous naval 
shipbuilding industry. 
It is arguable whether there is an arms race among Southeast Asian countries. 
However, Indonesia as a nation consisting of islands will need to guard its sovereignty at 
sea. Based on tensions caused by overlapping sea borderline issues as well as the illegal 
activities of neighboring countries in Indonesia’s EEZ and territorial waters, as well as 
losing claim to the Sipadan and Ligitan islands, it is obvious that Indonesia must see the 
potential for conflict in the sea. Therefore, having a powerful navy to protect the 
sovereignty of the country is a primary need for Indonesia and the nation’s leadership 
must emphasize developing Indonesia’s naval power by promoting the self-reliance of 
the domestic shipbuilding industry, which can enhance the building of a sustainable naval 
shipbuilding industry. 
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III. ANALYSIS OF SELF-RELIANCE MEANS IN THE CONTEXT 
OF NAVAL SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY IN INDONESIA 
The six important elements of sea power are geographical position, 
physical conformation, extent of territory, number of population, national 
character, and character of the government.” 
—Alfred Thayer Mahan, 
U.S. Naval Officer, Historian, and Strategist (Marsetio, 2014b). 
As an archipelagic country, Indonesia has all the elements to build naval 
capability to be a world-class navy. Therefore, the government must support the nation’s 
shipbuilding if Indonesia is to become a global maritime fulcrum nation with sufficient 
naval power. Indonesia’s main shipbuilding company PT PAL has grown significantly 
under the administration of President Joko Widodo with his ambitious concept to increase 
activity at sea by ensuring the connectivity of the inter-island sea trade lanes and ports 
(Yosephine, 2016). Yet, a consistent government policy is needed that also supports 
maritime defense strength by maximizing the indigenous shipbuilding industry. 
Indonesia’s government underlined the strategic development of the country to 
expand the national economy through sea transportation and activity development. The 
geography of Indonesia as a country surrounded by ocean makes it vulnerable to other 
neighboring countries claims. As the nations in Southeast Asia are shifting their previous 
focus on land-based power to building and modernizing maritime and air military power, 
Indonesia needs to modernize its navy. This focus requires technology mastery for 
successful regional power projection. 
A. INDONESIA’S GEOGRAPHICAL AND SOCIAL CONDITION 
Indonesia’s situation as an archipelagic nation and President Joko Widodo’s 
vision for it as a global maritime fulcrum provide the nation with new economic activity 
and expansion opportunities in the maritime industry. The government requires the nation 
to provide a strong distribution system through sea transportation and growing fishery 
activities, which should also be supported by a strong sea defense for the security of its 
people conducting activity there. Government programs to promote economic growth 
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through the sea by enhancing the distribution of goods and trade activity between 
Indonesia’s islands is an opportunity for 250 domestic shipbuilding companies to be able 
to meet the existing demand. The capacity of these domestic shipyards is being 
maximized by the government to support the merchant and naval shipbuilding industry in 
Indonesia. Figure 6 shows Indonesia’s geographic location, which supports the domestic 
shipbuilding industry’s existence. 
 
Figure 6.  Indonesia’s Local Shipbuilders. Source: IPERINDO (2015–2016). 
The importance of the territorial waters and the EEZs of the Indonesian nation as 
areas of transportation, exploration, and exploitation activities further clarify the need for 
a stronger Indonesian naval force and other law enforcement institutions at sea. These 
institutions will ensure the safety and security of marine resources and components of the 
communities (e.g., fishermen and the oil and gas industry) using marine facilities to run 
their businesses. 
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One consideration for a country willing to build and maintain its navy is its 
geographical location. Indonesia is facing the problem of unresolved sea border disputes. 
The potential for conflicts related to disputes and claimants from other nations is highly 
possible due to unresolved agreement on the sea borderlines defining areas rich in natural 
resources. Building a large navy will require resources and support from the government, 
and a country with a large navy is most likely to use its indigenous defense industry to 
produce its naval ships. 
The naval shipbuilding industry cannot work at its maximum capacity without 
strong ancillary industries. The industry will stimulate the growth of other industries, 
such as the marine engineering and machinery propulsion industry, electronics, and other 
high technology industries to support the ships’ sensors and weapons. The defense 
industry will also expand the opportunities for highly educated people in Indonesia’s 
universities, and for private companies to invest in R&D to support the industry, as 
happened in South Korea’s shipbuilding industry. Furthermore, the military spending 
previously allotted to ship procurement overseas can now be used to grow the industry 
and economic activity within the country while also building and maintaining the navy. 
From Figure 7, it is clear that Indonesia is facing a demographic bonus in its 
population growth. By 2025–2035, individuals in the most productive age group will 
dominate the population, offering the potential to be development agents. Yet, the 
demographic bonus would be wasted without adequate job opportunities (Rohmah, 
2014). On the other side, the advantages posed by the demographic bonus can support the 
shipbuilding industry if the government is capable of managing the available human 




Figure 7.  Indonesia’s 2016 Population Pyramid. Source: 
Population Pyramid (2016). 
B. HISTORY AND CURRENT STATE OF SHIPBUILDING IN INDONESIA 
Indonesia’s shipbuilding industry company PT PAL was the biggest shipbuilder 
company in Asia in 1939, when it was known as Marine Establishment (ME) during the 
Netherlands government era (Kukuh, 2017). The government then nationalized the 
company after Indonesia became an independent republic. The shipbuilding company 
was not used to its maximum purpose to increase the nation’s capacity as a maritime 
nation. The government restructured the company as PT PAL in 1980 to become the 
leading company in the naval and merchant shipbuilding industry in Indonesia. However, 
PT PAL was not completely capable of producing ships for the Indonesian Navy. 
A massive procurement of naval ships from the Soviet Union in President 
Soekarno’s era had made the Indonesian Navy into a strong naval power in the region 
(Global Security, 2013b). This procurement, however, was conducted without any 
technology transfer agreement. Consequently, the massive naval capability grew weaker 
without proper maintenance or new procurement with the end President Soekarno’s 
administration. Furthermore, diplomatic issues with Russia in 1970 made the navy 
incapable of maintaining its ships from Russia (Global Security, 2013a). 
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Under President Soeharto, Indonesia emphasized land-based military 
development to counter insurgency activity on land territory. The naval capability 
decayed as the naval ships became old and the main purpose of the PT PAL shipyards 
was limited to maintenance and ship repair activities. The Indonesian Navy procured 39 
ships of various types in 1992, when the government chose to buy Germany ships to 
modernize the navy and fulfill the naval capability needed at that time. The ships, 
however, did not last long and many ships degraded rapidly due to the difference in 
climate and sea conditions between Germany and Indonesia (Global Security, 2013a). 
Indonesian naval ship procurement was only conducted through off-the-shelf 
methods without any offset policy to support the naval shipbuilding industry. This did not 
change until the 1990s when Professor B. J. Habibie aimed for Indonesia’s defense 
industrialization while he was Indonesia’s minister of research and development (Willett, 
1997). At that time, the naval shipbuilding entity PT PAL conducted joint production of a 
naval patrol boat measuring 57 meters under German license (Global Security, 2013a). 
Since the government owns the naval shipbuilding industry as a strategic industry, PT 
PAL also builds the merchant ships for domestic and export purposes. It also manages to 
conduct maintenance, repair, and repower activities on Indonesia’s aging naval ships. To 
continue its activity, the naval shipbuilding company depends totally on government 
policy and support. 
According to Figure 8, Indonesia’s military expenditure has increased sharply 
during naval ship procurement. The procurement activity, however, did not contribute to 
Indonesia’s economy because no domestic naval shipbuilding industry was included by 
the government during the procurement process. The naval ships needed to cover the vast 
area of Indonesian territorial water requires the country to spend more of its budget. 
Moreover, the price of a naval ship’s technology is also expensive, which limits the 
number of ships that can be procured by the Indonesian Navy. 
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Figure 8.  Indonesia Military Expenditure. Source: Our World in Data (2017). 
Under President Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-2014) the law for 
supporting an indigenous defense industry was passed, Indonesia’s naval shipbuilding 
industry capability started to show much improvement. Since then, under President Joko 
Widodo’s administration, government consistency in supporting the defense industry has 
been strengthened, and currently, Indonesia’s shipbuilding industry holds an important 
role in supporting the government’s vision to make the country into a global maritime 
fulcrum. PT PAL has now become the largest naval shipbuilding industry in the country 
and is capable of contributing to the nation’s economic activity and maritime defense 
capability. Figure 9 explains the current state of PT PAL’s components supplier sources 
to support the industry in building ships indigenously. 
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Figure 9.  Indonesia’s Current State Shipbuilding Capability. 
Source: Arifin (2016). 
Despite PT PAL’s significant growth within the industry, Indonesia’s 
shipbuilding industry still depends on importing foreign materials to build the ship’s 
components. Based on Figure 9, in terms of technology mastery the current shipbuilding 
industry in Indonesia is still very far from the level of industry self-reliance as almost 
65% of a ship’s components are imported. This situation makes it hard for the industry to 
compete in delivery time and cost efficiency. 
C. INDONESIAN NAVY BLUEPRINT FOR MEF AS THE MARKET FOR 
NAVAL SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY 
The growth in economic development and the government’s awareness of 
protecting national sovereignty at sea, which contains a large amount of natural 
resources, centers the development of military power on air and naval technology 
mastery. In 2003, a naval modernization plan was developed as a 2013 blueprint for the 
Indonesian Navy by capability-based planning to achieve MEF capability. MEF is 
intended to build the naval forces up to the capabilities (depicted in Table 6) needed for 
dealing with threats that endanger the sovereignty of the state and national security 
interests (Marsetio, 2014a). 
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The navy modernization process increasingly opens opportunities for the defense 
industry to be involved in building the MEF program for the Indonesian Navy. The 
government policy, as outlined in a defense white paper, prioritizes the procurement of 
weapons, including warships, through domestic industry and emphasizes the important 
role of an indigenous naval shipbuilding industry being involved in building and 
maintaining the navy. Indonesian naval modernization towards MEF planning will 
expand Indonesian naval composition to 274 ships, consisting of 110 strike force ships, 
66 patrolling ships, and 98 support ships (Laksmana, 2014). If the domestic naval 
shipbuilding industry cannot accomplish this alone, however, it can involve the outside 
defense industry by emphasizing added value through the transfer of technology to the 
national industry, which implements the offset policy. Table 6 explains the potential 
demand for the domestic naval shipbuilding industry in Indonesia and the potential loss 
for the shipbuilding industry if the government is not consistent in building its industry 
self-reliance. 
Table 6.   Indonesian Navy Operational Capability Requirements. Source: 
Laksmana (2014). 
Naval Military Operations for War Naval Military Operations Other than War 
• Annihilation operations 
• Enemy naval lines interdictions 
• Self-protection of naval lines 
• Amphibious landing 
• Administrative landing 
• Coastal or beach defense 
• Mine warfare 
• Maritime security 
• Military sealift 
• Special warfare 
• Naval combat support 
 
• Counter-insurgency (against armed 
rebellions) 
• Counter-terrorism (maritime) 
• Maritime border security 
• Protection of strategic and vital objects 
• International peacekeeping 
• Presidential and foreign VIP protection 
• Support of local governments 
• Territorial defense and management 
• Internal security support to the police 
• Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief 
• Search and rescue operations 
• Counter piracy, armed robbery, and illicit 
trafficking 
o Corresponding basic operational capability 
and requirement 
Ships required under MEF 
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Naval Military Operations for War Naval Military Operations Other than War 
o Capable of executing combined naval 
operations and sea control at two different 
locations 
o Capable of executing an amphibious 
operation with one Marine landing team 
battalion (BTP) 
o Capable of executing an administrative 
landing operation with one army combat 
battalion 
o Capable of deploying a rapid reaction force 
(PPRC) with one marine BTP 
o Capable of performing various naval 
presence operations as part of overall naval 
diplomacy 
o Capable of executing a wide range of 
maritime security operations 
o Capable of executing special naval warfare 
operations, incl. intelligence, sabotage, or 
infiltration 
o Capable of providing various support 
functions in military force development and 
other military operations other than war 
38 ships of various types for two task forces 
(19 each) 
 
24 ships of various types 
 
16 ships of various types 
 








19 ships of various types 
 
The modernization in the Indonesian Navy increases the demand for naval ships 
procurement. As shown in Figure 10, the readiness condition of Indonesian naval ships is 
very low. Indonesia’s fleet readiness was on average only 69% for striking, supporting, 
and patrolling force ships operationally capable and even worse, only 41% or nearly half, 
for the sensor, weapon, and command (Sewaco) system, which is between 25 and 50 
years old (Laksmana, 2014). MEF as capability-based planning were designed to counter 
all the operational capability needed by the Indonesian Navy. Indonesia’s government has 
planned the modernization of the navy since 2008 to fulfill its MEF requirements. 
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Figure 10.  Basic Readiness of Primary Naval Assets, 2009. 
Source: Laksmana (2014). 
D. THE ROLE OF NATIONAL INDUSTRY IN THE NAVAL 
SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY 
The Indonesian naval shipbuilding industry is improving significantly and 
continuing to build the capacity and capability needed to provide the Indonesian Navy 
more ships domestically. The industry provides affordable naval ships that suit the 
Indonesian Navy’s requirements. It supports the government program for conducting 
offset policy by providing the capability to absorb the technology transfers from foreign 
industries for the improvement of the indigenous defense industry. 
PT PAL, as the strategic state-owned enterprise for producing naval and merchant 
ships, provides the ships’ maintenance and repairmen, and general engineering with 
specifications based on client needs (as written in the PT PAL company profile). PT PAL 
has conducted transfer of technology from previous patrol craft based on Lurssen’s PB 57 
design and then built indigenously and launched the KCR 60-M missile guided FPB 
(Jane’s by IHS Markit, 2013). Other technology transfer took place in building four 
Landing Platform Dock (LPD) Makassar class with the assistance of South Korea’s Dae 
Sun shipbuilding company. That led to the indigenously built LPD class KRI 
Banjarmasin-592 for the Indonesian Navy (Fish, 2009). The company then delivered two 
Strategic Sealift Vessels (SSV) derived from the LPD ship model, for the Philippines 
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Navy. This accomplishment accounted for increased foreign currency earnings from 
export activity in January 2016. At the same time, PT PAL launched the first PKR frigate 
SIGMA class 10514 with the assistance of Netherlands shipbuilder Damen Schelde 
Naval Shipbuilding under a transfer of technology agreement and as part of government 
efforts for indigenous naval shipbuilding industry self-reliance (Business Monitor 
International Ltd., 2017b). 
Some of Indonesia’s private companies with naval shipbuilding capability that 
focus on smaller navy ships are PT Caputra Mitra Sejati, PT Palindo Marine Ship 
Building (PSMB), and PT Lundin. PT Caputra Mitra Sejati as a general contractor 
company has produced KCR 40-M class missile attack craft. The company has already 
produced three ships and is building a fourth ship for the Indonesian Navy (Business 
Monitor International Ltd., 2017b). PT PSMB has also already produced four KCR 40-M 
and two PC 28-M patrol boats for the Indonesian Navy (Fadli, 2013). Currently, PT 
Lundin is working toward the second fast missile patrol vessel (FMPV), the 63-meter 
Trimaran class for the Indonesian Navy, which replaces the first ship that caught on fire 
and was completely destroyed. The second ship is claimed by the industry to have better 
fire-retardant composite material (Jane’s by IHS Markit, 2013). The Indonesian Navy 
requirements for naval ships is supporting the naval shipbuilding industry to keep 
productive and continue its production in the future. Furthermore, government support 
should allow the industry to export its product and also help to maintain a sustainable 
defense industry. 
E. INDONESIA’S SHIPBUILDING PLAN IN THE CONTEXT OF SELF-
RELIANCE 
PT PAL, as the center of naval technology development in Indonesia, is 
responsible to carry out industry cooperation in the field of marine naval technology with 
the government’s support. The plan of PT PAL as Indonesia’s strategic industry is to 
improve domestic industry capability to increase the amount of local material content 
used in the process of naval shipbuilding. Furthermore, PT PAL is capable of absorbing 
the transfer of technology according to the government’s offset policy to improve the 
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domestic naval shipbuilding industry capability, and to master submarine technology by 
preparing for better human resources capability. 
PT PAL, as a company in charge of naval vessel development, continues to 
improve its ability to carry out ship production independently. One of the mechanisms it 
relies on is the domestic support industry, which enables support for the construction of 
the ship. As shown in Figure 11, the current naval shipbuilding industry still relies on 
foreign industry for most of its materials, especially high technology components related 
for naval shipbuilding. 
 
Figure 11.  PT PAL Plan for Increasing Local Material Content in the Naval 
Shipbuilding Industry. Source: Arifin (2016). 
PT PAL plans to increase the level of local material content in the naval 
shipbuilding process by assembly and technology integration. This effort is intended to 
increase the naval shipbuilding industry’s self-reliance in Indonesia. It realized the 
dependency on foreign ancillary industries will directly influence cost as high import 
taxes and longer delivery times significantly increase the cost of shipbuilding (Arifin, 
 43 
2016). However, the plan is not clearly defined and PT PAL cannot work alone to 
increase the capability in producing all the required electricity, electronics, and 
machinery. Moreover, the government policy does not support enhancing the research 
and the development capability of the industry high technology requirement with 
Indonesia’s limited budget for R&D. 
The government plans to expand the naval shipbuilding industry to be capable of 
building submarines from the transfer of technology program with South Korea’s 
government through Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering (DSME) Company. 
Based on the agreement, PT PAL then plans to expand the capability by building the 
submarine facility infrastructure to build the last type 209 Chang Bogo class submarine 
ordered from DSME (Ibrahim, 2016). Yet, a report of joint production problems between 
PT PAL and DSME Company in submarine production created a reluctance to transfer 
the submarine technology and to slow down the transfer of technology due to human 
resource capability issues (Tran, 2017). Therefore, the government of Indonesia plans to 
establish long-term cooperation with a French company, DCNS, in acquiring the 
Scorpene class submarine and to build it in Indonesia through the transfer of technology 
as an offset policy (Tran, 2017). 
The government’s consistency in supporting the industry is very important for 
defense industry self-reliance. Government support builds the submarine infrastructure 
facility within PT PAL in Surabaya. Another strategy applied by the government to 
support the defense industry is to market domestic warship industry products to 
international markets in order to ensure the sustainability of the market for the industry 
currently developing in Indonesia. PT PAL signed a cooperation agreement in naval 
shipbuilding with two United Arab Emirate firms: Abu Dhabi Ship Building (ADSB) and 
International Global Group at the IDEX 2017 show. PT PAL’s cooperation with the two 
companies “will combine their capabilities and resources to create business opportunities 
in shipyards, maintenance, repair, and inspection of vessels” (Parameswaran, 2017). 
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F. SWOT ANALYSIS FOR INDONESIA’S INDUSTRY SELF-RELIANCE 
The government support for naval shipbuilding industry self-reliance requires 
continuous analysis and evaluation to understand the competitive environment which 
tends to change. The capability to adapt with the competitive environment in the naval 
shipbuilding industry and to conduct the analysis will allow the government and the 
industry to provide adequate strategic planning to achieve goals. From Table 7, the 
SWOT analysis provides the strategic assessment to analyze industry strengths and 
weaknesses, and also the capability to forecast opportunity and threats as an external 
factor which need to be adjusted and evaluated to achieve competitive advantage within 
the industry. 
Table 7.   SWOT Analysis 
Strengths 
• Strong strategic state-owned 
enterprise 
• Government defense offset policy 
and domestic market availability 
• Industry capable to produce 
military and general shipbuilding 
industry 
Weaknesses 
• Lack of support for R&D 
• Lack of competitive 
environment with only 1 major 
state owned shipbuilder 











• Naval modernization increases the 
demand for naval ships 
• Transfer of technology will increase 
the industry capability in naval 
shipbuilding 
• Opportunities to cooperate with 
other nations as the nation’s 
position as a non-alignment 
movement. 
Threats 
• Greater technology 
improvement by another 
foreign naval shipbuilder 
• The reluctance of foreign 
industry to conduct the 










Positive Factors Negative Factors  
 
(1) Strengths 
• A strong strategic state-owned enterprise naval shipbuilder to support 
absorption of naval shipbuilding technology through defense offset policy 
by transfer of technology agreement. 
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• Government policy to support the development of an indigenous naval 
shipbuilding industry by the consistency of applying defense offset policy 
and by maximizing the existence and capability of a domestic industry to 
fulfill the government’s ship requirements. 
• The industry’s purpose is not only for naval shipbuilding industry, but also 
to fulfill the national maritime purpose. This strategy is to make sure 
Indonesia’s naval shipbuilding industry will survive in the long term. The 
shipbuilding industry will be capable of producing merchant and other 
governments’ ships while the requirements or demand to build the naval 
ships from the Indonesian Navy are not yet needed. 
(2) Weaknesses 
• The government’s policy is not enhancing R&D with only a limited 
budget to support the defense industry self-reliance. 
• The defense industry in Indonesia is still limited to a state-owned 
enterprise in a strategic industry, which inhibits the motivation to compete 
for the development of the technology in the acquisition process (Business 
Monitor International Ltd., 2017b). 
• There is no available ancillary industry that can support the naval 
shipbuilding industry. 
(3) Opportunities 
• The government plans naval modernization to guard the nation’s 
sovereignty. 
• The transfer of technology agreement will enhance mastery of the 
technology of the domestic naval shipbuilding industry. 
• Indonesia’s position as a non-alignment movement nation widens the 
opportunities for the government to open up cooperation in the defense 
industry to all nations. 
(4) Threats 
• Fast growing technology development in the naval shipbuilding industry 
and better ship design, sensors, and weapons offered by foreign industry 
inhibits the domestic naval shipbuilding industry from competing. 
• The economic and strategic interests from counterpart nations must first be 
willing to conduct the defense offset policy, then it must not withdraw 
because of some objection and reluctance to continue the agreement. 
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By providing the SWOT analysis for Indonesian naval shipbuilding industry, the 
government can analyze and create policy to improve industry’s competitive advantage. 
The Indonesian naval shipbuilding industry is ready to absorb transfer of technology with 
the current shipbuilding industry capability. However, the industry still needs the 
government’s protection to provide stable demand by maximizing the contracts provided 
by the government as a requirement in building its own naval capability. The government 
then can expect the domestic naval shipbuilding industry to compete in the domestic and 
international markets to become self-reliant. 
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IV. THE STRATEGY TO SUPPORT NAVAL SHIPBUILDING 
INDUSTRY SELF-RELIANCE 
Indonesia’s naval shipbuilding industry is growing with government support by 
providing policies to allow it to mandate vessel procurement be built locally (Logam, 
2017). The industry can currently produce some types of naval ships for the Indonesian 
naval power build-up and sell the SSV type ships to the Philippines Navy as an export to 
contribute to Indonesia’s foreign currency earnings. Nevertheless, the strategy for 
improving self-reliance within the industry, which demands a rapid technological 
development and the integration of high-technology weapon systems and sensors, is 
insufficient to support industry self-reliance. The Indonesia’s naval shipbuilding industry 
still lacks industry capability to produce the ship’s components locally; almost 70% of 
ship components should be imported (Arifin, 2016). The naval shipbuilding industry in 
Indonesia still has limitations in its development that lead to a very low capability to 
build ships with local components. Most ship components still depend heavily on foreign 
industry such as marine machinery, radar, sonar, weapons system, etc. (Bitzinger, 2017). 
This capability is vital to support further logistics requirements for the shipbuilding 
industry. Thus, the government needs to improve and adjust the strategy to support naval 
shipbuilding industry self-reliance. 
A. DEVELOP A STRATEGY TO MAXIMIZE STRENGTH OF INDUSTRY 
CAPABILITY AND BUILD AN ANCILLARY INDUSTRY 
The naval shipbuilding industry capability and capacity currently already 
possessed by PT PAL as a state-owned company and private domestic shipbuilders, such 
as PT Caputra Mitra Sejati, PT PSMB, and PT Lundin should be used by government 
institutions to fulfill the needs for government vessel procurements. India’s naval 
shipbuilding industry showed the advantage of having state-owned shipbuilding industry 
that already has had much experience in and been exposed to building naval ships. The 
industry in India, however, suffers from inefficiency due to an uncompetitive 
environment where most of its naval shipbuilding contracts are awarded by the 
government to state-owned shipyards without competitive bidding against a private 
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shipbuilder (Behera & Misra, 2012). By contrast, the South Korean naval shipbuilding 
industry has a strong private shipbuilding industry, which contributes to a competitive 
environment within the industry. 
Maximizing the capability of the domestic naval shipbuilding industry will 
require a sound acquisition strategy and program management to ensure market demand 
for the industry and delivery time accuracy to fulfill the navy’s MEF objective. The 
Indonesian Navy’s requirements for navy ships LPD class and missile-guided FPB 60-
meter class already mastered by PT PAL can be maintained through contracts for future 
procurement from the government. The Indonesian Navy requires 16 fast missile boat 60-
meter ships and three have already been built. Currently, the shipbuilder industry has 
started the construction of a fourth ship based on the government order (Tempo, 2017). 
The current contract offered by the government is less efficient because the industry is 
already capable of doing full rate production. The contract will be more efficient by 
having multiple ships being built simultaneously to share overhead costs and to keep up 
the capability of the domestic industry through an ongoing learning process. This 
acquisition by the local naval shipbuilder will ensure the industry maintains its capacity 
to stay productive and maximizes the asset usage for the government’s interest. 
Furthermore, the industry would be capable of meeting Indonesian naval ships’ 
operational requirements in patrolling Indonesia’s waters and to accomplishing all naval 
missions. 
Government consistency in supporting a sustainable shipbuilding industry is very 
important as it will increase the capability and the capacity of the industry and the 
government’s strategy to conduct domestic procurement for naval ships. The consistency 
in providing market availability for the naval shipbuilding industry makes the industry 
capable of maximizing its capacity and gaining further funding for industry development. 
The South Korean Navy is building its naval forces to have a capability as a blue water 
navy. Its government through the Republic of Korea Navy provides the availability of 
demand for the industry by ordering naval ships from the domestic shipbuilding industry. 
The navy becomes the shipbuilding industries’ medium to advertise their naval 
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shipbuilding capability and generate export opportunities for the industry (The Diplomat, 
2013) 
The availability of ancillary industries to support self-reliance in the domestic 
shipbuilding industry is vital for industry efficiency and performance in building naval 
ships indigenously (Todd & Lindberg, 1996). According to Basuki et al., the shipbuilding 
process which caused the delay in PT PAL shipbuilding happened because the hull and 
machinery outfitting lacked proper materials. Their research was conducted using the 
Bayesian simulation method and found that material availability available for machinery 
was the main problem (Basuki, Manfaat, Nugroho, & Dinariyana, 2014). This situation 
caused the delay in the ships’ delivery due to the unavailability of ancillary industries, 
such as the marine machinery industry. Consequently, the shipbuilder had to import 
materials from overseas. The ancillary industries in the future require technology mastery 
and could open up opportunities for work and R&D opportunities. 
The availability of ancillary industries to support the shipbuilding industry is 
important. According to a PowerPoint presentation by Arifin, PT PAL’s president 
director, the shipbuilding industry in Indonesia is still in an immature state and has even 
less capability in the marine machinery and local ship components areas to support the 
industry (Arifin, 2016). The industry’s dependency on importing marine machinery and 
other ship components increases delivery time and additional high import tax costs for 
producing naval ships indigenously. High imports taxes for ship components and longer 
production time makes the industry less competitive, with 10% to 30% higher prices 
compared to the foreign shipbuilding industry (Arifin, 2016). This situation may cause 
the government to miscalculate in conducting the procurement of naval ships overseas 
and underestimate its own naval shipbuilding industry capability. India’s naval 
shipbuilding industry experienced the same issue when the industry depended on 
importing most of its marine engines and components or equipment. This situation also 
increased the time needed to build naval ships and incurred more expenses for the 
industry (Behera & Misra, 2012). India’s shipbuilding industry is still learning to 
overcome the lack of ancillary industries by increasing shipbuilding industry capacity. 
The goal is to gain recognition from the international marine machinery industry, so that 
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companies such as MAN, Rolls Royce, and Caterpillar will invest in building the 
ancillary industry in India (KPMG in India, 2008). India’s shipbuilding industry also 
learns from South Korea in terms of how to provide incentives to private industry, how to 
support R&D, and how to absorb local content into the shipbuilding industry (Thangam 
& Sureshkumar, 2015). 
Indonesia’s Ministry of Industry supports the effort to establish a marine 
machinery industry to be built domestically. The industrial minister of the Republic of 
Indonesia through the Indonesian ambassador to Japan tried to open up the relationship 
and cooperate with Japan’s Ishikawajima Heavy Industry (IHI) corporation to invest and 
build the marine machinery industry in Indonesia (Diela, 2014). The government of 
Indonesia needs to provide continuous improvement in its policy to support private 
industry to develop the growth of this ancillary industry for facilitating the growth of 
domestic shipbuilding industry. One of the policies is the cabotage policy, which restricts 
the shipping company from procuring ships from foreign shipbuilding companies. This 
policy will increase the demand on the national company to procure ships from the 
domestic shipbuilding company, which then will increase the demand for ships 
components from local industries (Yee, 2015). The involvement of the private sector will 
share the government’s burden of capital investment to support in developing the 
industry. 
B. BUILD RECOMMENDATIONS USING R&D AND LEARNING CURVE 
THEORY 
The South Korean government policy to support the shipbuilding industry 
followed the steps of import and the import-substitution, before it shifted to provide a 
huge amount of R&D to build its shipbuilding industry in the 1980s (see Table 8). The 
South Korean government pursued the industry to contribute to exports and support the 
nation’s economy. It then involved private industry to support the development of South 
Korea’s shipbuilding industry (Hassink & Shin, 2005). According to Berkok et al., South 
Korea’s offset policy aimed to support R&D and increase capability within the 
shipbuilding industry, which is mostly conducted by applying direct offset policy through 
the transfer of technology, co-production, and R&D assistance and participation in joint 
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R&D cooperation (Berkok, Penney, & Skogstad, 2012). Indonesia’s current effort to 
improve industry self-reliance is still lacks policy support for R&D. While the South 
Korean government encourages the private sectors to invest in shipbuilding technology 
R&D, the Indonesian government lack of policy to support R&D and private sector 
investment will most likely inhibit the industry’s development in Indonesia. 
Table 8.   Industrialization Sequence for Indonesia and South Korea 
Shipbuilding Industries 
South Korean Shipbuilding Indonesian Shipbuilding 
Prior to 1970: No shipbuilding industry, 
the only industry available is Korea 
Shipbuilding and Engineering Corporation 
(KSEC). The industry is dominated by 
import and foreign aid 
1945: PT PAL was nationalized as a state-
owned company. Its main activity is to 
repair and maintain Indonesian naval ships 
1980: The restructuring of PT PAL as a 
public company to provide opportunity for 
public investment. Improve the activity to 
repair and maintain both merchant and 
naval vessels 
1970: The central government starts to 
industrialize the shipbuilding industry. The 
development of infrastructure, heavy and 
chemical industries. The industry gains 
investment from chaebol and government 
intervention to support the industry in 
gaining more investments. The 
development of private shipbuilding 
industries 
1985: Starts the transfer of technology for 
patrol boat from German company to build 
PB 57-meters patrol boat 
2004: Transfer of technology of various 
types of naval ships, improving the human 
resources capability by sending skilled 
workforces to learn from the South Korean 
shipbuilding industry 
1980-1990: Shifts the policy from industry 
to technology through R&D. The 
government supports education and 
prepares human resources development 2012-current: Improvement in naval 
shipbuilding industry self-reliance. 
Government policy to support shipbuilding 
industry through domestic shipbuilding 
industrialization. The shipbuilding 
industry still lacks self-reliance to supply 
ship components 
1990-current: Transfer of technology with 
joint R&D and investment for the industry. 
Strong shipbuilding industries supported 
by strong ancillary industries 
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1. Building Naval Ships by Strengthening R&D 
Transfer of technology as offset policy as applied by the government of Indonesia 
in naval ship procurement, such as submarines from South Korea, requires further 
improvement by the industry to be self-reliant in producing the next ships. The 
government should do its own R&D and maintain and improve the knowledge from 
transfer of technology to build the next submarines of the same type for the Indonesian 
Navy. Government support to improve self-reliance in the naval shipbuilding industry is 
limited to the military expenditure budget, which is still under 1% of GDP, and the 
general R&D budget, which is still under 0.1% of the GDP. This support is necessary to 
improve the naval shipbuilding industry’s capability to compete with foreign industry and 
provide the export opportunities. The effort to achieve industry self-reliance by having 
only an import substitution policy and neglecting export orientation will cause the failure 
of industry self-reliance effort as happened in Latin America countries (Baer, 1984). The 
industry still depends on huge amount of imports of raw materials to fulfill the import 
substitution industrialization which increases the expenditure without the capability to 
compete in the international market to export its product (Baer, 1984). The same situation 
will be experienced by Indonesia’s shipbuilding industry, which still depends on 
importing ship components and marine machinery from foreign industries. 
The capability to build missile-guided FPB 60 meter is gained from PT PAL’s 
own R&D capability to design the ship by improving the capability from the previous 57-
meter patrol boat, which came from the transfer of technology by a German shipbuilder. 
The design is an improvement from its previous class to suit navy requirements for 
modern and advanced capability required to patrol Indonesia’s waters. Currently, African 
nations such as Senegal have expressed interest in procuring two units of fast missile 
boats, of the 45-meter class and 60-meter class, and Guinea Bissau and Gabon have each 
expressed interest in procuring two units of missile guided FPB 60-meter (Defense 
World, 2017). 
Indonesia’s naval shipbuilding industry is relying on the process of technology 
transfer to increase its self-reliance and technology development. The nation’s capability 
for R&D has not yet become the main effort to increase self-reliance for the defense 
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industry. India’s and South Korea’s shipbuilding industries apply different approaches to 
support their respective national capability for naval shipbuilding. The South Korean 
shipbuilder DSME provides investment for R&D specializing in the naval shipbuilding 
industry (OECD, 2015). The South Korean shipbuilding industry is supported by a strong 
private industry. This is an example of how the government can share its burden and the 
risk in developing the industry. While India’s government consistently conducts R&D in 
naval ship designs and naval weapon systems through the directorate of naval design 
(DND) and the weapons electronic systems engineering establishment (WESEE) to 
support the indigenous naval shipbuilding industry (Rai, 2015). Both countries provide a 
common method to strengthen its naval shipbuilding industry by strengthening its R&D 
capability. The government of Indonesia through the Indonesian Navy is to cooperate 
with the agency for the assessment and application of technology (BPPT) in improving 
the technological capability in naval weapon systems and shipbuilding self-reliance 
through research in mini-submarine design, small ships, and submarine battery 
engineering design (BPPT, 2015).5 
2. Learning Curve Theory 
In 1947, J.R Crawford introduced learning curve theory, which predicted that the 
learning process in every production effort would become more effective and faster as 
producers learned the production process. The study was conducted during World War II 
on the production process of airplane parts for the war (Mislick & Nussbaum, 2015). 
According to cost estimation reference theory, the practice guidelines for the shipbuilding 
learning curve slope is 80–85% (Mislick & Nussbaum, 2015). Thus, this research uses 
the most conservative number for estimating the cost, which is 85%. This means the cost 
of a second ship is 85% of the cost of first ship. Therefore, it will give higher number for 
estimating the cost than using 80% learning curve slope (shallower learning curve slope). 
The industry realizes benefits when it produces more ships due to the economy of scale 
                                                 
5 BPPT is an Indonesian non-ministry government agency under the coordination of the Indonesian 
Ministry for Research and Technology, with the main task to develop the application of technology and its 
main mission to improve industrial product and government agencies service competitiveness. For more 
detail, see: https://www.bppt.go.id/profil/sejarah 
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from the R&D of one type of ship (see Figure 12). The learning curves will keep on 
estimating lower costs as the learning process continueseven on a much smaller scale. 
 
Figure 12.  Learning Curve for Indonesia’s Missile-Guided FPB Cost Estimation 
Indonesia PT PAL launched three missile-guided FPB 60-meter with price tags of 
375 billion rupiahs for all three, which is equal to around USD 35 million 
(Boediwardhana, 2014). The Indonesian Navy planned on procuring at least 16 ships of 
this type to fulfill the MEF requirements (Viva, 2014). Figure 13 shows the price of a unit 
missile guided FPB 60-meter produced by Indonesia’s shipbuilder PT PAL. Domestic 
naval shipbuilding industry provides the opportunity to cut the shipbuilding cost by 
improving the efficiency through continuous learning process. 
Slope parameter (b) = ln (0.85)
ln (2)
= −0.234465 ; b + 1 = 0.765534 
Total cost calculation (CTN) is: 
CT3 = A × (1b + 2b + 3b)   35m = A × (1 + 2−0.234465 + 3−0.234465) 
     A = 35m
2.6229
 
First unit price theory  A = 13.344 (US$ million) 
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Cost of unit N = ANb 
Cost for second ship = 15.094 × �2−0.234465)� = 11.342 (US$ million) 
Cost for third ship = 15.094 × �3−0.234465)� = 10.314 (US$ million) 
Total 3 ships cost = (13.344 + 11.342 + 10.314) m = 35 (US$ million) 
  
Figure 13.  Indonesia’s Missile-Guided FPB Price Tag. Adapted from 
Pakistan Defence (2014). 
Based on the learning curve theory, the cost for building the next missile-guided 
FPB will not cost as much as $36 million ($12m × 3 ships). Furthermore, the cost of 
building the next ships will be lower as the learning process improves. PT PAL is able to 
build the fourth boat faster than it was targeted to finish. The working process is using 
modular method that provides the way to work on the ship’s parts in parallel at the same 
time (Tempo, 2017). The current shipbuilding process is faster and will cut the 
production time, labor hours, and variable overhead cost. Therefore, the cost for 
producing ships will be lower in each subsequent production of each ship due to the 
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increase in expertise and efficiency of the naval ship production, as shown earlier in 
Figure 12. 
The domestic naval shipbuilding industry can also produce patrol ships of the 
same type, but with lower weapons specifications or without weapons for other 
government-owned ship procurements in Indonesia, such as the marine police and 
maritime security board, to increase the number of patrol ships produced and gain the 
advantage from learning curve theory. Another benefit from the indigenous naval 
shipbuilding industry is the contribution to foreign exchange earnings from exporting 
naval ships to other countries interested in procuring ships from Indonesia. The 
government’s consistency in providing the demand for the domestic industry from the 
domestic demand for ships and promoting the industry to the global market will keep the 
flow of the money within the industry. The government should also support the private 
industry to get involved in the naval shipbuilding industry. Indonesia’s state-owned 
industry will cooperate with one private enterprise to build 30 patrol ships for the 
Indonesia Sea and Coast Guard (KPLP) under the Ministry of Transportation state ships 
requirements (Chandra, 2016). Thus, the private and state-owned industry will be able to 
benefit from the nation’s effort in building the industry. 
C. CHALLENGES IN THE FUTURE TO DEVELOP A SUSTAINABLE 
NAVAL SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY 
According to Bitzinger, Southeast Asia’s naval shipbuilding industry will mostly 
have the same challenges in the long range such as a lack of profitability, a lack of 
technology mastery, and corruption (Bitzinger, 2017). The challenges are likely to be 
experienced by Indonesia in its efforts to improve naval shipbuilding capability. 
1. Low Utilization of Shipbuilding Production Capacity 
According to Bitzinger, Indonesia’s naval shipbuilding industry is experiencing a 
lack of profitability due to the government’s inability to provide continuous contracts for 
the industry (Bitzinger, 2017). This situation may be caused by the R&D conducted by 
PT PAL to build a missile-guided FPB 60-meter, which has not yet reached the economy 
of scale to build more ships as per the nation’s requirements. While Indonesia needs 16 of 
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these boats, it has only ordered one ship to be built after the first batch consisting of three 
ships, which raises costs. Capacity development for the naval shipbuilding industry 
should also consider market demand. Overcapacity will cause the industry to suffer from 
labor and other depreciation costs of the equipment; moreover, a state-owned company 
such as PT PAL should pay its employees, excluding temporary workers, regularly. Thus, 
the government should also pay attention to the lost-opportunity cost that would be 
incurred by not being consistent in procuring naval ships from its own industries. 
Promoting domestic naval shipbuilding to expand the opportunity to export naval ships to 
counterpart countries offers the potential to increase the industry by using the capacity 
available in shipbuilding industry. After the export launch of two SSV ships ordered by 
the Philippine Navy, PT PAL experienced an increase in ship orders from counterpart 
countries, including military and non-military orders from Malaysia, Senegal, Guinea 
Bissau, and Gabon for the SSV ship and the missile-guided FPB (Sari, 2017). Turkey 
ordered a power barge or power plant ship as a non-military order from PT PAL. The 
company needs to restructure its business not only to build military ships, but also to 
maintain and improve its capability to build merchant ships (Sari, 2017). 
Even though there is no long-term contract the Indonesian government could 
provide to keep the business going, PT PAL can still survive, since naval shipbuilding is 
only one of several sub-divisions in the company. For example, merchant ship building is 
one of the primary businesses of PT PAL. Without a contract from the government, PT 
PAL can use its merchant ship building sub-division to sustain its business. Another sub-
division is the naval ship repair and maintenance. The Indonesian Navy continues to give 
contracts to PT PAL in these areas. 
2. Transfer of Technology as Offset Policy 
Technology transfer as an offset policy has proven to be a strategy that can 
facilitate a nation’s effort to reach self-reliance in the defense industry. The Indonesian 
government efforts to conduct transfer of technology in every naval ship procurement has 
improved PT PAL’s capability to build indigenously the LPD ship and missile-guided 
FPB for the Indonesian Navy (Sindonews, 2014). However, many cases have shown that 
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the agreement requires the willingness of the nation owning the technology to facilitate 
the process, and most countries are not willing to transfer all their technology for reasons 
of national security or competition within the industry. Indonesia experienced this 
problem in the procurement of Frigate 10514 from DSNS (Damen Schelde Naval 
Shipbuilding), a company from the Netherlands. The transfer of technology process in the 
effort to build the naval ship indigenously still limits the domestic industry in building the 
ship modules as a whole by PT PAL. Although five out of six modules were built at PT 
PAL, the last module was built in the Netherlands and delivered to Indonesia. A more 
complex module, consisting of the mast, radars, and other sensors, was also built in the 
Netherlands where the company is based. This situation poses a challenge for the industry 
if it is to be fully capable in absorbing all the shipbuilding technology knowledge from 
the counterpart country. 
3. Limited Shipbuilding Technology Expertise 
According to Bitzinger, the shipbuilding industry in Southeast Asia faces 
challenges in building small ships such as patrol boats, OPV, and corvettes, which are 
simple in terms of technology (Bitzinger, 2017). The situation is also true for Indonesia’s 
shipbuilding industry, which still lacks human resources capability. Therefore, the chief 
challenge is for the government to improve the capability of the available human 
resources within the industry to absorb current naval shipbuilding industry knowledge by 
sending its people to South Korea and gain the advantage of the transfer of technology 
process (The World Folio, 2013). 
Another challenge is to promote and support the private sector’s involvement in 
building the ancillary industries. In order to improve the shipbuilding industry, the 
government must increase available local content in the country by improving the market 
situation to promote both domestic and foreign investments that support the naval 
shipbuilding industry, especially the ancillary industry, which in general will also support 
growth in the private sector industry. The country’s shipping industry requires many 
ships to support economic activity that covers the ocean surrounding the nation. The 
availability of ancillary industries will provide for a strong shipbuilding industry. And, 
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this ancillary industry must be sufficient to provide the components needed for the 
industry to build the ships at a competitive price. 
The Indonesian government strategy to use the transfer of technology has a 
limitation when the process requires good cooperation between two countries willing to 
conduct the offset policy. Not all transfer of technology processes end in success. Such 
was the case of Malaysia in building its OPV indigenously, which ended with 
inefficiency, and now that navy can only acquire far fewer OPVs than previously 
planned. The industry lacked the readiness to conduct transfer of technology, which 
caused delays and technical problems (Balakrishnan & Matthews, 2009). The cooperation 
between the Indonesian Navy and BPPT should be maximized by preparing the domestic 
shipbuilding industry to absorb the transfer of technology conducted by PT PAL and 
DSME in building the submarine through a transfer of technology agreement. 
4. Corruption 
Indonesia’s corruption risk position, according to a Business Monitor 
International research report, was assessed as the worst of the countries focused on in this 
study. Its corruption risk score was 24 out of 100 as compared to India (with a score of 
29), Malaysia (30), and South Korea (36). Indonesia is in the highest position for risk of 
corruption, which in the future, will inhibit other nations’ interest in investing in 
Indonesia (Business Monitor International Ltd., 2017b). The corruption case that 
involved the president and director of PT PAL may discourage foreign nation 
counterparts from continuing their cooperation with the company and from ordering more 
naval ships (Jakarta Globe, 2017). Corruption in Indonesia’s shipbuilding industry may 
deter other nations from entering into contracts for naval ship procurements with 
Indonesia in the future. In fact, the export of naval ships to the Philippine Navy involved 
a broker or the third party to conduct defense systems procurement and acquisition. 
Handing over government control to a third party as the broker in defense systems 
acquisitions could minimize the chance of corruption (Hukum Online, 2017). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Self-reliance in the naval shipbuilding industry is important for Indonesia to build 
its naval power for maritime security and defense purposes. The nation is motivated to 
develop its maritime power to grow the nation’s economy through sea connectivity by 
supporting the domestic shipbuilding industry, enabling the indigenous production of 
both merchant and naval ships. Government support for the strategy and policy to 
enhance the industry is required due to the nature of the industry and the government’s 
involvement with a major company such as PT PAL. The transfer of technology in the 
naval shipbuilding industry has been proved to contribute to the shipbuilding industry by 
increasing the capability of its shipbuilders. However, the government needs to enhance 
and enable research and development by increasing the budget and promoting 
development of ancillary industries, and by promoting exports to all interested nations. 
The government strategy to reach self-reliance in the naval shipbuilding industry 
still faces many problems and challenges. Since the government still manages PT PAL, it 
currently bears all the risks of R&D in defense industry development. Furthermore, the 
government has yet to maximize the involvement of private industry in sharing the risk in 
developing the industry. Its policy does not provide any incentive to the people involved 
in the industry, which may prevent industry growth through the private sector in the 
future. 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The application of a defense offset policy through the transfer of technology 
should be followed by future contracts to maintain the knowledge and capability already 
achieved in the naval shipbuilding industry. The availability of continuous contracts 
within the industry will ensure that the industry grows and achieves the necessary 
economies of scale by applying the transfer of technology. 
The government also needs to provide policies to support the shipbuilding 
industry so that the industry can improve its competitive advantage through the 
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availability of ancillary industries. The existence of ancillary industries can also be 
improved through foreign investment in high technology industries, such as the marine 
machinery industry. Efforts must be made to build these industries locally, and one way 
to do that is to give foreign investors an incentive to invest and build the high technology 
industry not yet available in Indonesia. 
Research and development is another way to increase self-reliance, especially in 
the naval shipbuilding industry, which requires technological improvements to be 
competitive and capable of becoming export oriented. The government cannot rely only 
on technology transfer to increase self-reliance in the defense industry. The government 
can promote the defense industry as a creative industry and involve more people by 
increasing incentives through a better policy to support R&D within the country. The 
strategy to improve self-reliance for the naval shipbuilding industry as a part of defense 
industry will require a significant amount of capital for R&D for self-sufficiency. 
Indonesia currently lacks R&D capability because of the government’s policy and the 
limited budget allocated for the defense industry to conduct R&D activity. The 
Indonesian government would need to increase the military expenditure budget from the 
current allocation of less than 1% of GDP to 2% to significantly support R&D activity 
and increase self-reliance in the naval shipbuilding industry. 
B. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Research on the naval shipbuilding industry, especially in Indonesia, is still 
limited in terms of qualitative research assessing government policy effectiveness for 
naval ship procurements. In part, this is due to the limited data for military procurements. 
The number of procurements through transfer of technology as an offset policy applied 
by the government of Indonesia in every defense procurement can be recorded and 
quantitatively analyzed to understand the successes and failures of applying the strategy 
through effective policy in defense procurement to improve self-reliance in defense 
industrialization. Furthermore, the research can be measured more effectively by having 
enough quantitative data through the years. With sufficient data, research can try to 
identify the connection or even causality by having better R&D to support the industry in 
 63 
marketing the product domestically or exporting it. This data then can be used by the 
government in decision making for future policy to build a sustainable defense industry. 
The Indonesian government will need to review and, if necessary, revise its strategy 
periodically to support self-reliance in the defense industry. 
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